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Abstract:  
Quantitative risk assessment can play a crucial role in effective decision making about 
cybersecurity strategies. The Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) is one of the most 
popular models for quantitative cybersecurity risk assessment. It provides a taxonomic 
framework to classify cybersecurity risk into a set of quantifiable risk factors and combines 
this with quantitative algorithms, in the form of a kind of Monte Carlo (MC) simulation 
combined with statistical approximation techniques, to estimate cybersecurity risk. However, 
the FAIR algorithms restrict both the type of statistical distributions that can be used and the 
expandability of the model structure. Moreover, the applied approximation techniques 
(including using cached data and interpolation methods) introduce inaccuracy into the FAIR 
model. To address restrictions of the FAIR model, we develop a more flexible alternative 
approach, which we call FAIR-BN, to implement the FAIR model using Bayesian Networks 
(BNs). To evaluate the performance of FAIR and FAIR-BN, we use a MC method (FAIR-MC) 
to implement calculations of the FAIR model without using any of the approximation 
techniques adopted by FAIR, thus avoiding the corresponding inaccuracy that can be 
introduced. We compare the empirical results generated by FAIR and FAIR-BN against a large 
number of samples generated using FAIR-MC. Both FAIR and FAIR-BN provide consistent 
results compared with FAIR-MC for general cases. However, the FAIR-BN achieves higher 
accuracy in several cases that cannot be accurately modelled by the FAIR model. Moreover, 
we demonstrate that FAIR-BN is more flexible and extensible by showing how it can 
incorporate process-oriented and game-theoretic methods. We call the resulting combined 
approach “Extended FAIR-BN” (EFBN) and show that it has the potential to provide an 
integrated solution for cybersecurity risk assessment and related decision making. 
Keywords:  
Cybersecurity Risk Assessment; FAIR Model; Bayesian Networks; Monte Carlo Simulation; 
Risk Aggregation; Adversarial Risk Analysis; Game Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Cybersecurity has become a critical issue for most organizations due to their increasing reliance 
on IT systems and the increased complexity of the network environment [1].  Organizations 
face a diverse range of cyber-attack risks, which can cause data breach and more serious 
consequences [2], including forced interruptions in online services, impaired corporate 
reputation, and ultimately financial losses. To mitigate or even prevent these risks, 
Cybersecurity Risk Assessment (CRA) is required, since it can support risk managers to 
prioritize risks, allocate restricted resources to alleviate them, and make further defence 
decisions [3] [4].  
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) is a well-known CRA framework [5, 6] and has 
been widely applied and recognized in academic research [7] [8] [9] [10] and industry [11] [12]. 
To structure risk analysis, it uses a taxonomy to classify risk (financial loss) into risk factors 
and represent the relationships between these risk factors as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Taxonomy structure of the FAIR model 
FAIR covers more aspects of CRA compared to other prominent CRA frameworks [13]. It 
considers the capability contest between attackers and defenders, vulnerability of information 
assets, the frequency of successful attacks, and consequent financial losses, which has provided 
a good foundation for structuring CRA. The FAIR model is a combination of the FAIR 
taxonomy and statistical techniques and is used to conduct quantitative risk assessment [14] 
[15]. In this paper, we unpick the assumptions and algorithms used in the FAIR model and 
identify a number of potential serious limitations. Firstly, since the FAIR model uses only 
triangular distributions to simulate input risk factors of the model, alternative statistical 
distributions (especially long-tailed distributions [16] [17]) for input factors may be poorly 
approximated; this introduces inaccuracy. We provide detailed experimental analysis for this 
in Section 6. Secondly, it is difficult to extend the model to accommodate other modelling goals 
and perspectives. To address these limitations, we develop a more flexible alternative approach, 
which we call FAIR-BN, to implement the FAIR model using Bayesian Networks (BNs) [18] 
[19]. FAIR-BN subsumes the existing features of the FAIR model while: (1) allowing a wider 
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set of distributions to represent and process input variables; and (2) supporting both a deeper 
model of the cyber-attack-defend process and decision making and evaluation. 
By employing BNs, we connect the FAIR model with other advanced CRA models to enhance 
the original model, for example to analyse interaction between attackers and defenders. 
Interaction between attackers and defenders is a crucial element in CRA, since it influences 
both risk assessment and decision making about control deployment. However, the related 
analysis in the FAIR model is simplified and is relatively high-level. BNs have been widely 
applied in modelling more detailed features of the cyber-attack-defend process, for instance, 
from the process-oriented perspective, such as attack graphs [20], and from the game-theoretic 
perspective, such as Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) [21]. In our work, we have incorporated 
a process-oriented model and a game-theoretic model with the FAIR-BN to provide the 
integrated risk assessment and management solution. We call them Extended FAIR-BNs 
(EFBNs). 
We evaluate the quantitative accuracy of FAIR and FAIR-BN using results generated by the 
proposed FAIR-MC and the measurement J divergence [22] [23]. FAIR-MC is a Monte Carlo 
(MC) simulation based implementation of the FAIR model. We construct FAIR-MC strictly 
complying with the inference mechanism assumed by the FAIR model. The major difference 
between FAIR-MC and the FAIR model is in how a core calculation process, called risk 
aggregation, is performed. The FAIR model uses cached data generated from a kind of MC 
method combined with statistical approximation techniques, including applying Bounded 
Metalog Distributions (BMDs) [24] and an interpolation method to carry out risk aggregation. 
The application of these approximation techniques introduces inaccuracy into the FAIR model. 
In comparison, FAIR-MC uses simulation to conduct risk aggregation without using extra 
approximation techniques and thus avoids introducing the sequential inaccuracy. Moreover, in 
each test, we generate a much larger number (one million) of samples using FAIR-MC to 
represent the standard and measure the distance between this standard and results (represented 
one thousand samples respectively) generated by the FAIR model and FAIR-BN using J 
divergence. We assume that the smaller J divergence the model has against the FAIR-MC, the 
more accurate the model is. 
We empirically compare the results generated by FAIR and FAIR-BN with a focus on accuracy 
under different statistical scenario assumptions, and in particular ‘long tail’ assumptions. We 
use three empirical cases to test if the FAIR model can maintain accuracy in different scenarios 
where the assumptions differ. We also compare the performance of FAIR-BN against FAIR in 
all of these cases. Experimental results illustrate that the FAIR-BN and the FAIR model provide 
consistent results compared with FAIR-MC in general. However, in certain cases, FAIR-BN 
provides more accurate results, especially in the long-tail case. These evaluation results lay the 
foundation for confidently implementing and extending the FAIR model using Bayesian 
Networks.  
The contributions of this work are: (1) we provide a detailed and in-depth analysis of the 
assumptions of the FAIR model, which has hitherto not appeared in the literature, and reveal a 
number of important limitations; (2) we propose a new approach called FAIR-BN that 
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incorporates the same modelling assumptions used by the FAIR model but also supports wider 
assumptions and can be more easily extended; (3) we construct a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation 
(FAIR-MC) without using the approximation techniques that applied by FAIR and introduce J 
divergence [22] [23] to perform accuracy evaluation for the FAIR model and FAIR-BNs; (4) 
we evaluate the performance of the FAIR model and the proposed FAIR-BN and identify cases 
where the FAIR model produces inaccurate results; (5) we construct EFBNs incorporating the 
FAIR-BN with a process-oriented model and a game-theoretic model to provide integrated risk 
assessment and in tandem illustrate how the FAIR-BN can be expanded.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce related cybersecurity work with 
a focus on how it might be used in the FAIR-BN approach. In Section 3, we introduce the FAIR 
model focusing on its taxonomic structure and algorithms. In Section 4, we describe FAIR-BN, 
i.e. how to faithfully represent the FAIR model using BNs. We describe FAIR-MC and J 
divergence in Section 5. Experiments evaluating the performance of the FAIR model and the 
FAIR-BN are provided in Section 6. In Section 7, we provide examples illustrating flexibility 
and expandability of the FAIR-BN. We discuss pros and cons of the FAIR model, FAIR-BN 
and FAIR-MC in Section 8 and provide conclusions in Section 9. 
2. Related work 
FAIR is applied in [9] to assess loss event frequencies of smart grid cyber threats and is 
employed by [10] to evaluate threats of Android malware. However, both studies only applied 
the qualitative framework of FAIR. The FAIR model is applied in [7] to analyse risk in cloud 
computing. In general, these studies fail to provide deeper insight into, or evaluation of, the 
FAIR model; nor do they suggest how its deficiencies might be addressed. In this paper, we 
aim to remedy this. 
The FAIR model provides a relatively high-level risk assessment framework. To model more 
detailed features of the cyber-attack-defend process and support decision making and 
evaluation, we propose extending the FAIR by eliminating its limitation of expandability using 
our proposed FAIR-BN and by connecting it with other dedicated CRA models. There are two 
kinds of models that we explore as enhancements of the FAIR-BN, process-oriented risk 
assessment models and game-theoretic models. 
Several process-oriented risk assessment methods for CRA have been developed in recent 
decades. Typical paradigms include threat trees [25], attack trees [26], attack graphs [27] and 
defence trees  [28]. These methods provide graphical notations which illustrate the attacker’s 
goals with possible routes to reach these goals and then help to identify the controls regime 
required to thwart the attack threat. For instance, the defence tree is an extension of attack trees 
with added leaves representing controllable countermeasures. However, in general, these 
studies fail to consider the capability of attackers and the frequency with which that the attack 
might be successfully executed to endanger financial losses. To alleviate such drawbacks, 
Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAG) [20, 29] and the security graph model [30] have been proposed 
as alternatives. These approaches apply Bayesian probabilistic logic to conduct CRA. However, 
none of them provides a unified risk aggregation mechanism for producing an interpretable 
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risk evaluation result. In our work, we have implemented a unified risk aggregation mechanism, 
based on the work of [31], using BNs and producing financial losses to represent risks. 
Game-theoretic methods have also been widely applied to cybersecurity issues [32-35]. 
Specifically, a game-theoretic model is applied to solve the network defend-attack problem in 
[36]. However, a recognized feature of game-theoretic solutions is the lack and asymmetry of 
information, such as the absence of knowledge about the attacker’s strategy domains or payoffs 
[37]. Several ways to capture the uncertainty in game theory are proposed in [38] [39] [21]. 
Among them, [21] is a monograph that describes how to use the perspective of Adversarial 
Risk Analysis (ARA) to address the uncertainty in game theory. A broad review of applications 
of ARA in a variety of game contexts (i.e. simultaneous games, sequential games, etc.) is 
provided in [21] and extended in [40] and [41]. In ARA, the decision problem can be structured 
and represented by an Influence Diagram (ID), which is a generalization of a BN. For cases 
with more than one decision makers, Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams (MAIDs) are proposed 
as an extension of IDs [42]. A game model can hardly guide risk managers for decision making 
and consequence evaluation individually. Given this, incorporating the game model with 
unified payoff modelling is a feasible solution but can usually be neglected in game theory 
studies, especially in the cybersecurity context. In our work, we have explored the combination 
of a game-theoretic model and the FAIR-BN, which can support decision making about defend 
deployment in the defend-attack game and predict residual loss posed by cyber-attack within 
the integrated model.  
An attempt to improve the flexibility of FAIR by using BNs was proposed in [8]. This work 
applied a part of the FAIR framework to assess the success frequency of cyber-attack events in 
smart grids. However, this work does not consider the whole FAIR structure nor use 
quantitative reasoning. In our work, we present a complete implementation of the FAIR model 
using BNs and explore directions for improving it by incorporating process-oriented models 
and game-theoretic models.  
Here the application of BNs is focused on their ability to represent probabilistic reasoning (i.e. 
implementing the FAIR model) and causal reasoning (i.e. the process-oriented model in 7.1) together, 
derived from subject matter expertise and from the structure of the networked system. However, 
it is possible, using data alone, to learn the BN graph structure and/or the strengths of statistical 
associations between variables. In this way, they offer a universal approach to causal and 
statistical reasoning, complementing the absence of data with expertise and vice versa. 
Relevant examples include [43, 44].  
3. Overview of the FAIR model 
3.1 FAIR model structure: taxonomy and aggregation 
The taxonomy structure of the FAIR model [5, 14] was shown in Figure 1, with the risk classes 
being modelled. Risk (financial loss) is defined by Loss Event Frequency (LEF) and Loss 
Magnitude (LM). LEF is defined as the frequency that a threat agent will inflict harm on an 
information asset within a given timeframe and itself is a function of Threat Event Frequency 
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(TEF) and Vulnerability (V), where the former represents ‘the frequency that a threat agent 
will act against an asset’, whilst the latter is defined as ‘the probability that an asset will be 
unable to resist the actions of a threat agent’ [6]. TEF is the frequency that a threat agent will 
come into contact with an asset and the probability that a threat agent will act against an asset 
once contact occurs (referred to as Contact Frequency (CF) and Probability of Action (PoA) 
respectively). V is the difference between the level of force that a threat agent is capable of 
applying against an asset (Threat Capability (TC)) and the strength of control (Resistance 
Strength (RS)). LM is categorized as either a Primary Loss (PL) or Secondary Loss (SL) (these 
are assumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive [14]). In the FAIR model, PL represents 
the direct losses from assets and threats whilst SL represents secondary consequential losses 
such as negative organizational and external environment after effects. Furthermore, secondary 
loss is broken down into the Secondary Loss Event Frequency (SLEF) and the Secondary Loss 
Magnitude (SLM).  
The key feature of the FAIR model is that the structure and taxonomy are fixed and cannot be 
extended, so any differences in assumptions cannot be supported (such as a different, perhaps 
more detailed way, to model threats and defences). 
Figure 2 shows the FAIR risk aggregation calculations diagrammatically and shows the 
statistical operations and objects needed to calculate risk using the FAIR taxonomy. The FAIR 
model makes many, quite reasonable assumptions, but some are implicit. Total losses are 
calculated by adding primary and secondary losses, each of which is calculated by multiplying 
loss frequency and loss magnitude, but with the caveat that secondary loss events can only 
occur given that primary loss events have occurred beforehand. In this way, an element of 
causal conditioning is introduced into the risk aggregation process that is not immediately 
obvious. Secondary loss frequency is, therefore, a function of the primary loss frequency. If 
there is zero chance of a secondary loss, then there will no secondary loss events to aggregate. 
Primary losses are also treated differently from secondary losses in that there are the causal 
assumptions; frequency of primary losses is calculated from threat event frequency and 
vulnerability.  
 
Figure 2 Risk aggregation structure in the FAIR model 
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(Risks are shown as grey rectangles, frequency measures as boldly outlined rectangles, probability measures as dotted 
rectangles and financial loss magnitude measures as undashed white rectangles. Operators are shown as (+) or (x) for 
addition and multiplication) 
3.2 FAIR model algorithms: simulation-based calculation  
The FAIR model proposes a series of functions relating variables (risk factors), which 
statistically or probabilistically represent the functional relationships between a factor and its 
sub-factors [14]. We summarize the factors and functions in Table 1. 
Table 1 Output and input factors and functions used in the FAIR model 
 
Analysis proceeds from bottom to top (step 7 to step 1) through the risk aggregation structure 
using the function declared for each input-output factor combination. The FAIR model is built 
in Excel and uses an add-in sample generating tool, SIPmath [15]. In the model, each risk factor 
is represented as a random variable, from which generated samples are stored in a column of 
data, which is referred to as a Stochastic Information Packet (SIP). The sample distribution of 
each factor can either be calculated from its sub-factors or randomly simulated using a 
triangular distribution specified by the user. Functions listed in Table 1 can be performed on 
corresponding sample vectors.  
Risk assessment through the FAIR model includes two procedures: assessing loss event 
frequencies (calculating factors 3-7) and aggregating loss magnitudes using assessed 
frequencies to calculate the total loss (calculating factors 1-2). By simulating samples for input 
factors and operating these samples following corresponding functions, loss event frequencies 
can be calculated, which is straightforward.  
A key process in FAIR is Risk Aggregation (RA), where the compound sums, 𝐿𝑃 and 𝐿𝑆, of 𝑛 
Independently Identically Distributed (IID) loss magnitude random variables, 𝐿𝑀𝑃 and 𝐿𝑀𝑆 ,  
is computed where 𝑛 is determined by a value from frequency variables,  𝐹𝑃 and  𝐹𝑆, [31] [45]. 
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A Poisson distribution, 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆), is used to model primary loss frequency, 𝐹𝑃, using a mean 
frequency estimate,  𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹, following the function  𝐹𝑃 = 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆 = 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹). As is shown 
in [46], the FAIR model simplifies the risk aggregation process that could be conducted using 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation directly. Instead, the FAIR model uses cached simulation results 
combined with a statistical approximation technique to simplify this process for more efficient 
calculation.  
To prepare the cached data, samples of  𝐿𝑃 corresponding to  𝐹𝑃 and 𝐿𝑀𝑃 pairs are simulated, 
and statistical parameters are derived from the samples and stored. These parameters are then 
used to construct an approximated quantile distribution function (Bounded Metalog 
Distribution (BMD)) approximating 𝐿𝑃. After obtaining the BMD of 𝐿𝑃, samples of 𝐿𝑃 can be 
generated from the BMD expression using uniformly distributed random probabilities. We 
provide details of how the BMD is constructed within the FAIR model in Appendix A and 
demonstrate how the FAIR model uses BMDs and cached data to produce risk aggregation 
results in Appendix B.  
We have already highlighted the implicit basic causal assumptions about cyber events 
embedded within the FAIR model, namely that the secondary and primary losses are 
conditionally dependent, by definition. There is also an implicit statistical assumption in FAIR, 
namely that triangular distributions are used throughout to model user inputs. However, such 
distributions might not always be valid or suitable. For instance, an expert may wish to 
represent their uncertainty about an input parameter using some other statistical distributions 
or may wish to vary how  𝐹𝑃  is calculated, perhaps by including information gained from 
complementary analysis, such as kill graphs or that derived from adversarial risk analysis. We 
propose using Bayesian Networks (BNs) as an alternative way to implement, extend the FAIR 
model and eliminate its restrictions, which is described in section 4 and 7.  
4. Modelling FAIR using Bayesian networks 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are widely used for probabilistic reasoning and have very wide 
applicability, including enabling statistical reasoning such as machine learning from data [47, 
48], diagnostic inference and causal reasoning [49]. In this paper, we use BNs as an alternative 
to FAIR, in the form of FAIR-BN, and extend FAIR-BN incorporating process-oriented and 
game-theoretic methods. 
A BN is a directed acyclic graph representing a factorization of a joint probability distribution, 
consisting of nodes representing variables and arcs representing causal or probabilistic 
relationships (the qualitative part) with probabilistic weights (the quantitative part) sometimes 
modelled using statistical and deterministic functions. In a BN, each node 𝑋𝑖 has an associated 
probability table, 𝑃((𝑋𝑖| 𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖)), called the Conditional Probability Table (CPT) of 𝑋𝑖 given 
its parent variables, 𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖). For a node 𝑋𝑖 without parents, the CPT is the marginal probability 
distribution of  𝑋𝑖, 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) . The conditional-independent relationship among variables, 
represented by the absence of arcs, allows simplification of a BN’s joint probability distribution 
which can be represented by the product of CPTs. Furthermore, the marginal distribution of 
the child variable can be obtained by marginalizing over its parent variables in the joint 
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distribution [19]. For example, considering a simple BN consisting of three nodes, in which 
nodes A and B are parents of node C, and CPTs are 𝑃(𝐴), 𝑃(𝐵) and 𝑃(𝐶|𝐴, 𝐵), we can get the 
joint distribution of this BN from 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶) =  𝑃(𝐴) 𝑃(𝐵)𝑃(𝐶|𝐴, 𝐵)  and calculate the 
marginal distribution of the child node C following 𝑃(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶)𝐴,𝐵 . 
 
More generally, the joint distribution of a BN can be calculated following formula (1):  
                                          𝑃(𝑋1, … . , 𝑋𝑛) = ∏ 𝑃((𝑋𝑖| 𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖)) 
𝑛
𝑖=1      (1) 
This significantly reduces the complexity of inference tasks in BNs. The CPT embodies the 
probabilistic reasoning mechanism into BNs. More relevant details are carefully explained in 
[19].  In this paper, we have used AgenaRisk [50], a commercial BN package, to build BNs 
and perform calculations. AgenaRisk contains off-the-shelf functions for performing inference 
on hybrid BNs (those containing both continuous and discrete nodes), influence diagrams and 
for performing compound sum calculations. FAIR-BN and EFBNs can all be implemented 
using AgenaRisk. 
As explained in Section 3, Risk Aggregation (RA) is the core reasoning process of the FAIR 
model, since all the calculations throughout the model recursively calculate the total loss from 
the derived loss event frequency and loss magnitude distributions. However, the relationship 
between the involved factors and the mechanism used when conducting RA is implicit in the 
FAIR model’s assumptions. In this subsection, we reveal the mechanism of the RA process 
and propose algorithms to implement RA using BNs based on the work in [31]. Finally, we 
provide the BN for calculating loss event frequencies which includes calculating output factors 
3-7 listed in Table 1. The accuracy of the BN’s results is then evaluated. The relevant 
experimental results are provided in Section 6. 
There are two types of risk aggregation (denoted as 𝑅𝐴1 and 𝑅𝐴2) needed in FAIR-BN as 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Types of risk aggregation process 
 
To show how 𝑅𝐴1  is implemented using BNs, we introduce the calculation of 𝐿𝑝 =
𝑅𝐴1(𝐹𝑝, 𝐿𝑀𝑝) as an example. This calculation is conducted using n-fold convolution [31] [45]. 
Assuming that, in a given period, a cyber event can happen n times where n is any number 
between 0 and the upper bound N, and the event has a fixed Loss Magnitude distribution 𝐿𝑀𝑃, 
the primary loss distribution 𝐿𝑃 can be calculated following the n-fold convolution shown by 
formula (2): 
                                  𝐿𝑃 = 𝑃(0)𝐿𝑃0 + 𝑃(1)𝐿𝑃1 + 𝑃(2)𝐿𝑃2 +⋯+ 𝑃(𝑁)𝐿𝑃𝑁  (2) 
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Here 𝐿𝑃𝑛  represents the n-fold distribution of  𝐿𝑀𝑃 , with  𝐿𝑃0 = 0, 𝐿𝑃𝑛 = 𝐿𝑃𝑛−1 + 𝐿𝑀𝑃 for 
 𝑛 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑁 and 𝑃(𝑛) is the probability of  𝐹𝑃  = 𝑛. This n-fold convolution method, which 
conducts 𝑅𝐴1 based on probabilistic inference, has been implemented by the compound sum 
function in AgenaRisk. In Figure 3, we show a 𝑅𝐴1 result given input distributions for primary 
loss frequency and magnitude. 
 
Figure 3 𝑅𝐴1result of FAIR-BN 
with 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹 following  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 20,𝑚𝑙 = 80,𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  180)  
whilst 𝐿𝑀𝑃 following  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 100,𝑚𝑙 =  175,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 200) 
 
The BN shown in Figure 4 models the relationships among associated variables involved in the 
risk aggregation process 𝑅𝐴2.  
 
Figure 4 Risk factors involved in 𝑅𝐴2 
 
In the 𝑅𝐴2 process, the distribution of Total Loss (TL), 𝐿𝑇, can be calculated by conducting 
risk aggregation on the joint frequency 𝐹𝑃&𝑆 and the corresponding Loss Magnitudes (LM), 
which is denoted as 𝐿𝑇 = 𝑅𝐴2 (𝐹𝑃&𝑆,  𝐿𝑀𝑃,  𝐿𝑀𝑆).  We, therefore, extend the n-fold 
convolution represented by formula (2) to that shown in formula (3): 
                                  𝐿𝑇 = ∑ [∑ 𝑃(𝐹𝑃 = 𝑛, 𝐹𝑆 = 𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=0 × (𝐿𝑃𝑛 + 𝐿𝑆𝑚)]
𝑁
𝑛=0    (3) 
In formula (3) 𝐿𝑃𝑛  represents the n-fold distribution of 𝐿𝑀𝑃  with 𝐿𝑃0 = 0, 𝐿𝑃𝑛 = 𝐿𝑃𝑛−1 +
 𝐿𝑀𝑃 for  𝑛 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑁 , whilst  𝐿𝑆𝑛  represents the n-fold distribution of 𝐿𝑀𝑆  with 𝐿𝑆0 = 0,
𝐿𝑆𝑚 = 𝐿𝑆𝑚−1 + 𝐿𝑀𝑆 for 𝑚 = 1 to 𝑛. The function 𝑃(𝐹𝑃 = 𝑛, 𝐹𝑆 = 𝑚) is the joint frequency 
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distribution that represents the probability that  𝐹𝑃  = 𝑛  and  𝐹𝑆  = 𝑚 . We simplify this 
expression as 𝑃𝑛,𝑚. We use the BNs (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 5 to illustrate the  𝑅𝐴2 process 
represented by formula (3). 
 
Figure 5 BNs used to implement the 𝑅𝐴2 risk aggregation process 
We firstly simplify the BN (c) to BN (e) in Figure 5, by creating total loss variables 𝑇𝑛,𝑚 which 
represent the compound results of the associated probability densities, 𝐿𝑃𝑛 and 𝐿𝑆𝑚. By doing 
so, 𝐿𝑇  can be calculated by aggregating densities of  𝑇𝑛,𝑚  following the joint frequency 
distribution. This calculation can be very space inefficient. One solution is to factorize this 
density aggregation process. A general way of doing so is referred to as the Compound Density 
Factorization (CDF) method. A CDF method is proposed to calculate 𝑅𝐴1 in [31]. We have 
extended this 1-Dimension CDF method to a 2-Dimensions CDF method to implement risk 
aggregation on the joint frequency distribution as the  𝑅𝐴2  process. We use AgenaRisk to 
implement the related algorithms which are described in Appendix C. An example result 
showing how 𝑅𝐴2 is calculated is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 𝑅𝐴2 result of FAIR-BN 
with 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹 following 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 20,𝑚𝑙 =  80,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 180),  
𝑃𝑆𝐿 following  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.2,𝑚𝑙 = 0.3,𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  0.7), 
 𝐿𝑀𝑃 following  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 100,𝑚𝑙 = 240,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 400)  
whilst 𝐿𝑀𝑆 following  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 80,𝑚𝑙 = 140,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 200) 
 
Loss event frequency is also modelled in FAIR using some statistical dependencies on threat 
event frequency and vulnerability variables. These are themselves dependent on contact 
frequency, probability of action and threat capability and resistance strength respectively. 
Given BNs can model statistical relationships, they can quite naturally be modelled as shown 
by the BN in Figure 7. Additionally, it is possible to extend/replace nodes in this BN to allow 
us to upgrade a FAIR-BN, incorporating everything FAIR can do, thus providing greater 
flexibility. 
 
Figure 7 FAIR-BN for calculating 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐹𝑆 
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5. Simulation and evaluation using Monte Carlo  
5.1 Implementing the FAIR model using Monte Carlo 
Monte Carlo (MC) methods are a broad class of computational algorithms that generate 
numerical results from repeated random sampling [51]. In this section, we describe how we use 
MC simulation methods to implement functions in the FAIR model as listed in Table 1 with a 
focus on the risk aggregation processes. This series of MC simulations constitute the FAIR-
MC. Note that in our FAIR-MC, we do not employ the BMD approximation nor use cached 
data. This is the most significant difference between the FAIR-BM and the FAIR model. 
Firstly, we introduce how we implement the 𝑅𝐴1 process using FAIR-MC. The 𝑅𝐴1 process 
represents the calculation of primary loss, 𝐿𝑃,  using risk aggregation of the corresponding loss 
event frequency, 𝐹𝑃, and loss magnitude, 𝐿𝑀𝑃. Assuming 𝑛 samples of 𝐹𝑃 have been generated 
following the specified input distribution (this procedure is straightforward referring to Table 
1), for each simulated sample, 𝑓𝑖, of 𝐹𝑃, we simulate 𝐿𝑀𝑃 sample 𝑓𝑖 times and sum them up to 
get one sample of 𝐿𝑃. Conducting the same procedure for all samples of  𝐹𝑃, we can get 𝑛 
sample of 𝐿𝑃. The simulation result is a vector of size 𝑛, of which each element is  represented 
by formula (4): 
                                                                  𝐿𝑃
𝑖 = ∑ 𝐿𝑀𝑃
𝑘𝑓𝑖
𝑘=0   (4) 
where 𝑖 = 0,… , 𝑛 and 𝐿𝑀𝑃
𝑘 represents the kth simulated sample of 𝐿𝑀𝑃  following the given 
distribution.  
 
The method of generating a sample set for secondary loss using FAIR-MC is quite similar. For 
each sample of the primary loss frequency, 𝑓𝑖, we simulate a sample of the secondary loss 
frequency 𝑓𝑖
′  following the Binomial distribution, 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑛 = 𝑓𝑖 , 𝑃 = 𝑃𝑆𝐿
𝑖 ) , where 𝑃𝑆𝐿
𝑖  
represents the ith sample of 𝑃𝑆𝐿. Here 𝑃𝑆𝐿  is occurrence probability of the secondary loss.  Then 
we can generate a sample vector for the secondary loss 𝐿𝑆, with secondary loss magnitude 𝐿𝑀𝑆 
as formula (5): 
                                                                  𝐿𝑆
𝑖 = ∑ 𝐿𝑀𝑆
𝑘𝑓𝑖
′
𝑘=0   (5) 
where 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑖 = 0,… , 𝑛) represents the 𝑖 th randomly simulated sample of  𝐹𝑠  which follows a 
Binomial distribution, and 𝐿𝑀𝑆
𝑘 represents the kth simulated sample of 𝐿𝑀𝑆 following the given 
distribution.  
The sample set of the total loss 𝐿𝑇 can be generated based on simulation work above using 
formula (6):  
                                                                     𝐿𝑇
𝑖 = 𝐿𝑃
𝑖 + 𝐿𝑆
𝑖   (6) 
Each sample of the total loss 𝐿𝑇
𝑖  is calculated by summing the corresponding primary loss 
𝐿𝑃
𝑖𝑗
 and secondary loss 𝐿𝑆
𝑖𝑗
.  
Simulating vulnerability, attack capability and, furthermore, the associated primary loss event 
frequency using FAIR-MC is quite straightforward by generating input samples and operating 
samples following functions summarized in Table 1.  
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5.2 Accuracy evaluation  
We evaluate the accuracy of the FAIR model by comparing marginal probability distributions 
produced by the FAIR model against the marginal probability distributions produced by (a) 
FAIR-MC simulation and (b) FAIR-BN.  
Our aim here is to determine whether the approximation techniques used by FAIR give rise to 
undesirable inaccuracies and to compare the accuracy of the FAIR model and the 
corresponding FAIR-BN model. 
The accuracy measure we use is based on K-L (Kullback-Leibler) divergence, which measures 
the distance between two distributions, 𝑝(𝑥) and 𝑞(𝑥) shown by formula (7), [52]:  
                                                          K(𝑝 ∥ 𝑞) = ∫𝑝(𝑥)𝑙𝑛
𝑝(𝑥)
𝑞(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥  (7) 
Since 𝐾(𝑝 ∥ 𝑞) is not a symmetric measurement, instead we use a symmetric divergence 
measure referred to as J divergence shown by formula (8) [22] [23] : 
                                                        J(𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝐾(𝑝 ∥ 𝑞) + 𝐾(𝑞 ∥ 𝑝)  (8) 
For each function listed in Table 1, we use FAIR-MC to simulate the output factor using a large 
number of samples (one million). Then, we apply J divergence to measure the distance between 
the sample distribution calculated by FAIR-MC against results generated by the FAIR model 
and the FAIR-BN for each output risk factor. The smaller the J divergence the model has 
against the FAIR-MC, the more accurate the model is.  
6. Experimental analysis  
Our experiments are designed to test the performance of the FAIR model and the FAIR-BN in 
diverse scenarios. We use one million samples generated by FAIR-MC as the standard to 
evaluate the results of the FAIR model and FAIR-BN. In Section 6.1 we evaluate whether 
FAIR-BN can produce consistent results when it complies strictly with the calculation 
assumptions encoded within the FAIR model. These rules include using only triangular 
distributions as inputs and the use of functions summarized in Table 1. These evaluation results 
lay the foundation for confidently implementing and extending the FAIR model using BNs.  
In Section 6.2 we consider more realistic scenarios that do not adhere to the strict assumptions 
underlying the FAIR model. In practical cases, the input data would be much more diverse and 
complicated. For example, there could be a burst in the frequency of an information asset being 
attacked in a timeframe. An indication of this could be the existence of Advanced Persistent 
Threat (APT) [53]. APT can make the targeted information asset dormant under attacks for a 
long time period. For this reason, using right-long-tailed distributions [17] [16], that recognize 
the probability of extremely large frequencies,  to represent the frequency of cyber events is 
realistic.  FAIR’s triangular distributions would be a poor approximation in such scenarios, 
hence introducing inaccuracy. Poor approximations of the data generation process underlying 
the Loss Event Frequency (LEF) and Loss Magnitude (LM) can directly influence the output 
of the model (the ultimate assessment of financial losses posed by cyber events). For this reason, 
we focus our experiments on the 𝑅𝐴1 process and have considered two practical scenarios 
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when LEF follows long-tailed distributions and when LEF is small. Likewise, given the FAIR 
model employs cached data and approximation techniques to simplify the calculation, its 
resulting accuracy may be more strongly impaired when LEF takes fixed values that fall 
between cached values. We have evaluated performance of the FAIR model and the FAIR-BN 
under these three cases in subsection 6.2. 
The results of the FAIR model are generated using the Open Fair™ Risk Analysis Tool [15], 
which is built using Excel. Its method of calculation is described in [14]. We have carefully 
analysed this and have provided more detailed explanation in section 3, Appendix A and 
Appendix B.  We have used AgenaRisk [50], a commercial BN package, to build FAIR-BNs 
and perform calculations. We also have implemented the 𝑅𝐴2 process by developing a program 
using the AgenaRisk Java API. Related theory and algorithm details are provided in Section 4 
and Appendix C. 
We use Matlab [54] to generate samples following the Monte Carlo (MC) method for each test 
and call them the results of FAIR-MC. One million MC samples are used in each test to reflect 
the distribution of the output factor. In all of the tests, we use one thousand samples generated 
by FAIR-BN and the FAIR model respectively to represent the results from the two models. 
We provide mean, variance, and 99th quantile statistics for the risk aggregation results 
generated by FAIR, the FAIR-BN and FAIR-MC as a basis for comprehensive comparison. 
Furthermore, we use J divergence to measure distance between FAIR-MC results and results 
generated by the FAIR model and the FAIR-BN for comparing accuracy of the models. 
6.1 Experimental tests complying with assumptions of the FAIR model 
6.1.1 Experimental tests of risk aggregation processes 
With the assumptions of the FAIR model, 𝐿𝑀𝑃  follows a triangular distribution, 
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 (𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 100,𝑚𝑙 = 175,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 200) , whose parameters 𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑚𝑎𝑥  and 𝑚𝑙 
represent lower bound, upper bound and most likely value to simulate 𝐿𝑀𝑃 in the 𝑅𝐴1 process. 
In tandem with this, we change parameters of the  𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹  distribution across test cases and 
furthermore set the distribution of 𝐹𝑃  by Poisson ( 𝜆 =𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹)  to force diverse shape 
combinations of 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐿𝑀𝑃. 
These three methods generate consistent results for 𝐿𝑃. In our seven tests, the average value of 
J(FAIR, FAIR-MC) is 0.0236 while the average value of  J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) is 0.0230. 
This shows that, given the same input parameters for 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹  and 𝐿𝑀𝑃 , the 𝐿𝑃 outputs generated 
by the FAIR model and the FAIR-BN models are consistent with distributions generated by 
FAIR-MC. More detailed statistics for the seven experimental tests are shown in Table 3. We 
also use Euclidean distance [55] to measure the distance between FAIR-MC against FAIR and 
FAIR-BN. We use Eu(FAIR, FAIR-MC) and Eu(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) to represent Euclidean 
distance between FAIR and FAIR-BN against FAIR-MC respectively. In the seven tests 
recorded in Table 3, the average Eu(FAIR, FAIR-MC) vs Eu(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) is 0.0283 
vs 0.0232. This result confirms that the three models provide consistent results in these seven 
tests. More detailed results of the Euclidean measurement are given in Appendix E (Table 12). 
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Table 3 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with inputs following triangular distributions  
 
Next, we experiment on the 𝑅𝐴2 process, considering 𝐿𝑇 = 𝑅𝐴2(𝐹𝑃&𝑆,  𝐿𝑀𝑃,  𝐿𝑀𝑆). To keep 
inputs consistent with the FAIR model, our experiments on the 𝑅𝐴2  process follow the 
calculations shown in Figure 8, where boldly outlined nodes represent input variables that are 
specified using triangular distributions in the FAIR model. 
 
Figure 8 Related variables in the 𝑅𝐴2 process 
In our experimental tests, 𝐿𝑀𝑃  follows  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 100,𝑚𝑙 = 200,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 400), 
𝐿𝑀𝑆  follows 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 80,𝑚𝑙 = 140,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 200)  and 𝑃𝑆𝐿  follows 
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.2,𝑚𝑙 = 0.3,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.7). Five typical shapes are assigned to 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹 to 
construct test cases. We show experimental results of the 𝑅𝐴2 process in Table 4. 
Table 4 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑇 distributions 
 
Again, the FAIR and the FAIR-BN models generate consistent 𝐿𝑇 distributions compared with 
the FAIR-MC results. The average value of J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) is 0.0160 while the average 
min mid max FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 0 20 90 5877 5870 5804 9.8E+06 1.1E+07 1.0E+07 13795 14339 13800 0.0174 0.0161
2 0 230 300 28504 27857 27964 1.0E+08 1.2E+08 1.1E+08 46787 49883 46792 0.0332 0.0323
3 20 80 180 14946 14730 14778 2.8E+07 3.3E+07 3.0E+07 27641 28643 27537 0.0230 0.0195
4 60 250 400 37986 37458 37473 1.2E+08 1.4E+08 1.3E+08 60939 63143 61108 0.0239 0.0354
5 20 250 630 48359 47237 47517 3.8E+08 3.8E+08 4.0E+08 92552 93069 93838 0.0194 0.0189
6 15 30 250 15844 15686 15560 7.2E+07 7.1E+07 7.5E+07 36490 36500 36782 0.0168 0.0160
7 15 30 540 31587 31168 30890 3.6E+08 3.9E+08 3.8E+08 77924 78953 78070 0.0312 0.0225
Average: 0.0236 0.0230
Test 
MPLEF Mean Variance 99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
min mid max FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Include 0 0 200 500 7.2E+04 7.1E+04 7.1E+04 9.4E+08 1.0E+09 1.0E+09 1.4E+05 1.5E+05 1.4E+05 0.0362 0.0119
2 Long tail 50 200 1000 1.3E+05 1.3E+05 1.3E+05 3.9E+09 4.2E+09 4.1E+09 2.8E+05 2.8E+05 2.8E+05 0.0237 0.0122
3 Left skew 20 80 200 3.1E+04 3.1E+04 3.0E+04 1.3E+08 1.5E+08 1.4E+08 5.8E+04 5.9E+04 5.9E+04 0.0320 0.0214
4 Right skew 20 160 200 3.9E+04 3.8E+04 3.8E+04 1.4E+08 1.6E+08 1.5E+08 6.2E+04 6.3E+04 6.3E+04 0.0264 0.0202
5 0 and long tail 0 200 1000 1.2E+05 1.2E+05 1.2E+05 4.1E+09 4.4E+09 4.4E+09 2.8E+05 2.8E+05 2.8E+05 0.0237 0.0145
Average: 0.0284 0.0160
Mean Variance 99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
MPLEF
Test Description 
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value of  J(FAIR, FAIR-MC)  is 0.0284. This shows FAIR-BN and FAIR generate consistent 
results when implementing the 𝑅𝐴2 process and the FAIR-BN model generates slightly more 
accurate results. We also use Euclidean distance to measure the distance between FAIR-MC 
against FAIR and FAIR-BN for the confirmation. The average Eu(FAIR, FAIR-MC) vs 
Eu(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) is 0.0378 vs 0.0178, which confirms that the three models provide 
consistent results in these five tests. More detailed results of Euclidean measurement are given 
in Appendix E (Table 13). 
6.1.2 Experimental tests of subsidiary risk factors in the FAIR model 
In addition to the risk aggregation processes 𝑅𝐴1  and 𝑅𝐴2 , there are four other functions 
applied in the FAIR model as listed in Table 1. We have implemented these in FAIR-BN and 
FAIR-MC:  
1. The Mean of Primary Loss Event Frequency (MPLEF) is calculated from the Threat 
Event Frequency (TEF) and Vulnerability (V):  𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹 = 𝐹𝑇𝐸 ×  𝑃𝑉 . For this, the 
average value of J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) is 0.0069 and the average value of  J(FAIR, 
FAIR-MC) is 0.0310.  
2. The Primary Loss Event Frequency (PLEF) is derived from MPLEF following 𝐹𝑃 =
𝑃oisson (𝜆 = 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹): here the average value of J(FAIR, FAIR-MC) is 0.0170 and the 
average value of  J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC)  is 0.0059. 
3. The Secondary Loss Event Frequency (SLEF) is computed from PLEF and Chance of 
Secondary Loss (CSL) following 𝐹𝑆 = 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑛 = 𝐹𝑃, P = 𝑃𝑆𝐿) and this produces 
an average value of J(FAIR, FAIR-MC) = 0.0213 and the average value of J(FAIR-BN, 
FAIR-MC)  =  0.0053.  
4. The outputs of Vulnerability, which are derived from Threat Capability (Tcap) and 
Resistance Strength (RS) following 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃(𝑃𝑇𝐶 > 𝑃𝑅𝑆) are probabilities. The FAIR 
model and FAIR-BN have similar performance.   
Experimental results above show that in calculating LEF and its sub-factors both the FAIR 
model and FAIR-BN provide consistent results compared with FAIR-MC. We provide more 
detailed results of these experimental tests in Appendix D (Table 8, 9, 10 and 11). 
6.2 Experimental tests of other practical scenarios 
Here we evaluate the performance of the FAIR model and the FAIR-BN in the 𝑅𝐴1 process 
under two scenarios where LEF follows long tailed distributions and where LEF is small. Also, 
given the FAIR model employs cached data and statistical techniques in simplifying the 
calculation, we also evaluate performance in the 𝑅𝐴1 process where LEF has several fixed 
values, i.e. where poor approximation might be most evident. We focus the experiments on the 
𝑅𝐴1  process in this subsection since it is the core calculation in the FAIR model and can 
directly influence the output of the model (the ultimate assessment of financial losses posed by 
cyber events). 
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6.2.1 LEF follows long-tailed distributions 
We use three right-long-tailed distributions (which have the possibility of extremely large 
values) to represent the LEF: 
 Weibull distribution (shape = 1.5, scale = 100) 
 Log Normal distribution (mean = 3, standard deviation = 0.5)  
 Gamma distribution (alpha = 2, beta = 20)  
Since these are continuous distributions, to keep their features and model frequencies, we have 
used each of them as the parameter 𝜆 for a Poisson distribution to construct the discrete integer 
distributions for the corresponding LEF in our test. LM in these tests follows a Log Normal 
distribution (mean = 5, standard deviation = 0.25). Results generated using the FAIR model, 
FAIR-BN and FAIR-MC for 𝐿𝑃 = 𝑅𝐴1(𝐹𝑃,  𝐿𝑀𝑃)  are recorded in Table 5. We compare 
distributions of primary losses, 𝐿𝑃, generated by these three models in Figure 9. 
Table 5 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with 𝐹𝑃 following long-tailed distributions  
 
 
 
Figure 9 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with 𝐹𝑃 following long-tailed distributions  
 
The average J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) is 0.0103 in these three test scenarios. This is consistent 
with J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) in the general cases shown in Table 3. However, the average 
J(FAIR, FAIR-MC) is 0.6066, which is significantly larger than the average J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-
MC). The experimental results demonstrate that the FAIR model losses accuracy when dealing 
with long tailed distributions, while FAIR-BN provides more accurate results that are 
consistent with results generated by FAIR-MC. This is illustrated intuitively in Figure 9. We 
also use Euclidean distance as an alternative measurement in this test group, and the results can 
lead to the consistent conclusion. More detailed results of this are given in Appendix E (Table 
14). 
PLEF PLM FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Weibul l LogNormal 1.4E+04 1.4E+04 1.4E+04 4.3E+07 9.8E+07 9.0E+07 29705 43254 42892 0.7683 0.0074
2 Log Normal LogNormal 3.7E+03 3.5E+03 3.5E+03 2.2E+06 4.3E+06 4.0E+06 7305 10034 10218 0.5412 0.0161
3 Gamma LogNormal 6.4E+03 6.2E+03 6.1E+03 1.0E+07 2.1E+07 2.0E+07 14275 20927 20663 0.5102 0.0073
Average: 0.6066 0.0103
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
Test 
Input Distributions Mean Variance 99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
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6.2.2 LEF and LM using other statistical distributions 
In addition to the long tail distribution scenario, there are other situations that may require 
different distributions rather than those assumed by FAIR. For example, FAIR uses a Poisson 
distribution, with an input triangular distribution, to simulate the LEF for the further risk 
aggregation. In practice, the Binomial distribution is better suited to model frequency 
distributions with low values of n and higher values for p (the Poisson is the limit version of 
the Binomial where n is large and the probability of success, p, is small).   
We conduct four tests (whose statistical and graphical results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 
10 respectively). To simulate LEF, we use a Binomial distribution (number of trials = 50, 
probability of success = 0.2) in tests 1 - 2 and a Triangular distribution (min = 10, ml = 60, max 
= 100) in tests 3 - 4.  For LM, we use a Triangular distribution (min = 100, ml = 175, max = 
200) in test 1, a Log Normal distribution (mean = 5, standard deviation = 0.25) in tests 2 - 3 
and a Gamma distribution (alpha = 8, beta = 30) in test 4. The results show that FAIR is less 
accurate than FAIR-BN and does not even achieve the accuracy that FAIR has in general cases, 
that we analysed in subsection 6.1.  
Table 6 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐿𝑀𝑃 following other distributions  
 
 
Figure 10 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐿𝑀𝑃 following other distributions  
PLEF PLM FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Binomial Triangular 1.7E+03 1.6E+03 1.6E+03 3.6E+05 2.2E+05 2.1E+05 3215 2798 2705 0.1748 0.0138
2 Binomial Log Normal 1.7E+03 1.5E+03 1.5E+03 3.6E+05 2.3E+05 2.1E+05 3237 2733 2656 0.2357 0.0176
3 TriangularLog Normal 9.6E+03 8.6E+03 8.8E+03 9.8E+06 9.9E+06 9.9E+06 15811 16720 16437 0.2240 0.0570
4 Triangular Gamma 1.5E+04 1.4E+04 1.4E+04 2.5E+07 3.1E+07 2.8E+07 25186 28721 27864 0.2561 0.0531
Average: 0.2227 0.0354
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
Input Distributions Mean
Test 
Variance 99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
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The average J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC) in this test group is 0.0354 which is consistent with the 
general cases shown in Table 3. However, the average J(FAIR, FAIR-MC) is 0.2227, which is 
much larger than the average J(FAIR-BN, FAIR-MC). The statistics shown in Table 6 and 
distribution comparisons shown in Figure 10, demonstrate the insufficiency of FAIR in the 
𝑅𝐴1 process when it approximates distributions of input variables using triangular distributions.  
6.2.3 LEF with fixed values  
Given the FAIR model applies approximation techniques to implement risk aggregation, we 
apply seven tests involving loss event frequencies that are of fixed values rather than 
distributions, since it is here that poor approximation might be most evident.  
As shown in Table 7, mean, variance and 99th quantile values of results generated by FAIR, 
the FAIR-BN and FAIR-MC models are consistent with each other across all tests. The average 
of J divergence between FAIR-BN and FAIR-MC is lower than that between FAIR and FAIR-
MC (0.0183 vs 0.0768), leading to the conclusion that the FAIR-BN model is more accurate in 
this scenario. 
Table 7 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with 𝐹𝑃 is of fixed values 
 
6.3 Summary conclusions from experiments 
We can conclude that both the FAIR and FAIR-BN models can provide consistent results 
compared with the FAIR-MC standard. However, given that FAIR focuses on simulation 
efficiency, approximates input variables using triangular distributions and uses cached data and 
the interpolation method, the model shows insufficiency in dealing with cases when LEFs 
follow long tailed distributions, LEF and/or LM follow other distributions (rather than 
triangular distributions) and LEF are of fixed values. In these three scenarios, the FAIR model 
shows inaccuracy when conducting the 𝑅𝐴1  process. In comparison, the FAIR-BN model 
provides highly accurate results across all the experimental tests.  
  
FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 60 9.5E+03 9.5E+03 9.5E+03 2.7E+04 2.8E+04 2.8E+04 9.9E+03 9.9E+03 9.9E+03 0.0996 0.0193
2 120 1.9E+04 1.9E+04 1.9E+04 5.4E+04 5.6E+04 5.6E+04 2.0E+04 2.0E+04 2.0E+04 0.0805 0.0163
3 175 2.8E+04 2.8E+04 2.8E+04 7.9E+04 8.0E+04 8.0E+04 2.8E+04 2.8E+04 2.8E+04 0.0626 0.0159
4 230 3.6E+04 3.6E+04 3.6E+04 1.0E+05 1.1E+05 1.1E+05 3.7E+04 3.7E+04 3.7E+04 0.0719 0.0217
5 310 4.9E+04 4.9E+04 4.9E+04 1.4E+05 1.5E+05 1.6E+05 5.0E+04 5.0E+04 5.0E+04 0.0666 0.0179
6 390 6.2E+04 6.2E+04 6.2E+04 1.7E+05 1.8E+05 1.9E+05 6.3E+04 6.3E+04 6.3E+04 0.0875 0.0215
7 630 1.0E+05 1.0E+05 1.0E+05 2.8E+05 2.9E+05 2.9E+05 1.0E+05 1.0E+05 1.0E+05 0.0686 0.0156
Average: 0.0768 0.0183
Test LEF
J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
Mean Variance 99th
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7. The extended FAIR-BN models 
 A wider range of distributions can be applied to represent input factors in the FAIR-BN 
including for risk aggregation processes and the assessment of loss event frequencies. Here we 
show an example to demonstrate that the FAIR-BN model can accommodate different 
distributions for the loss event frequency and loss magnitude factors used in risk aggregation 
(and could easily do so elsewhere). Figure 11 shows a FAIR-BN model result achieved by 
computing  𝑅𝐴1  with Truncated Normal (TNormal) distributions [56] being assigned to 
primary loss event frequency, 𝐹𝑃, and the corresponding loss magnitude, 𝐿𝑀𝑃, rather than a 
Poisson distribution and a triangular distribution used in the FAIR model.  We use TNormal 
distributions with 0 as their lower bounds to represent PLEF and PLM are not negative. Other 
rational distributions can be applied as well. 
 
Figure 11 A 𝑅𝐴1 result of FAIR-BN with inputs following TNormal distributions 
𝐹𝑃 follows 𝑇𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇 = 40, 𝜎
2 = 100, 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 0,𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 200) whilst 
𝐿𝑀𝑃 follows 𝑇𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇 = 400, 𝜎
2 = 100,000, 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 0,𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 10,000) 
7.1 Extending the FAIR-BN using a process-oriented model 
In addition to providing more flexibility when modelling input distributions and providing 
more accurate results, more importantly, the FAIR-BN can be easily extended to model the 
causal processes that represent the interactions between cyber attackers and defenders. The 
FAIR-BN model can, therefore, be customized to model these factors directly, as cause-effect 
relationships with associated probabilities. Here we show how we might integrate a simple 
process-oriented model into the FAIR-BN, replacing the calculation of the vulnerability 
variable in FAIR by a richer causal structure. We show this model in Figure 12.
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Figure 12 FAIR-BN extended by a process-oriented model  
 
22 
 
In this model, an information asset is assumed to have three vulnerable aspects (vulnerability 
X, Y, Z) that can be attacked by a threat agent, whilst the threat agent has the capability to attack 
and exploit each of the vulnerabilities. Controls A and B in the example model can be deployed 
to reduce the vulnerabilities for one or more vulnerable aspects. Each control is characterised 
by Operational Effectiveness (OE) which is its probability of reducing vulnerability (i.e. 
controls are not perfect). The OE of a control is determined by two factors: the extent of 
deployment and design effectiveness. The output of the control scenario is the vulnerability 
which represents the probability that the threat agent delivers an attack to the asset successfully. 
The conditioning logic connecting the variables could be modelled using simple Boolean 
“AND” and “OR” relationships and CPTs could be elicited from expert knowledge. The 
probabilities used in this model are an example, which will not influence the reasoning 
mechanism which we have described in section 4. Similarly, other process-oriented risk 
assessment models, such as the kill chain model [57] and attack graphs [20, 29]  can be 
combined with the FAIR-BN for more advanced risk assessment. 
7.2 Extending the FAIR-BN using game theory (adversarial risk analysis) 
In the FAIR model, the vulnerability of an information asset is determined by a contest between 
attackers and the defender. The classical game theory finds the Nash equilibrium for all players 
simultaneously and therefore provides an optimum solution to this contest. However, relatively 
new methods such as Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) [58] provide an alternative solution 
whereby the decision problem is analysed from the view of a specific decision maker (attacker 
or defender). For example, from the defender’s point of view, a model considers the likely 
behaviour of the attackers and seeks to optimise the utility of the defender’s decisions. In ARA, 
the decision problem is structured and represented by an Influence Diagram (ID) which 
generalizes Bayesian Networks. Here we show how a sequential defend-attack game model 
borrowed from [21], can be accommodated to construct an EFBN. 
An ID is a directed acyclic graph with three kinds of nodes: decision nodes, shown as rectangles; 
chance nodes, shown as ovals; and utility nodes, shown as diamonds. Figure 13 shows the ID 
of a sequential defend-attack game model in the defender’s perspective [21]. In this model, the 
defender has a discrete set of possible defence levels D = {𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑𝑛} , which are 
represented by the decision node D (Defences). After observing the potential defence levels 
that can be implemented, the attacker has a discrete set of possible attack levels A = {𝑎1,
𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑚}  represented by node A (Attacks). A dashed arc pointing from node D to A 
represents the fact that the attacker’s decision depends on the potential defences. Moreover, 
from the defender’s perspective, the choice made by the attacker is a random variable. Hence, 
node A is a chance node rather than a decision node in this model. Whether the attack is 
successful is represented by the chance node S which is conditional on D and A. Finally, D and 
S determine D’s utility. 
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Figure 13  The defender’s influence diagram 
An example using adversarial risk analysis is shown in Figure 14, which is represented by an 
Influence Diagram (ID) built with a BN.  We assume that the defender’s decision is about 
whether to equip the capability of a defence, 𝑑, to protect a target information asset. Meanwhile, 
after observing the defender’s capability, the attacker would consider whether to deploy a 
corresponding attack capability, 𝑎, against it. Here we give uniform values to the Defence 
Capability node, representing the defender’s open mindedness, while assuming that if the 
attacker finds that the defender has capability 𝑑, the probability that she deploys capability, 𝑎, 
is 0.9, otherwise, the probability under different circumstances would be lower (0.7). This is 
shown by the CPTs in Figure 14.  The CPT of the Success node models how the attacker and 
defence capabilities interact to determine the probability of attacker success.  The utility node 
models the defender’s payoff given the defence capability deployed (utility: -100) and the cost 
of being attacked successfully (utility: -200). Here we specify utilities using individual values 
as an example. The utilities can also be assigned by distributions in this ID.  
 
Figure 14  The BN according to the defender’s ID 
Typically, the aim in decision analysis is to maximize the utility node of the supported decision 
maker. Corresponding to the ID shown in Figure 14, a Decision Tree (DT) can be generated 
using AgenaRisk. We show this DT in Figure 15 (a). The applied algorithms and details for 
generating DTs from hybrid IDs in AgenaRisk are described in [19]. The optimum decision is 
shown with the bold arc in the DT, showing the maximum utility decision for the defender is 
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to deploy the defence capability (utility: -128, otherwise the utility would be -144). By entering 
this decision to the ID, we can assess vulnerability of the asset, shown in Figure 15 (b), which 
can be then used in our FAIR-BN for further analysis.  
 
Figure 15 Decision results of the defender’s ID 
8. Discussion 
We have introduced how we use BNs and the MC method to implement the calculation through 
the FAIR model and compared the performance of the three methods. In this section, we discuss 
performance, efficiency, flexibility, expandability features of the FAIR model, FAIR-BN and 
FAIR-MC from the perspective of cyber analysts and cyber risk managers. 
 
First of all, in general, the three methods provide consistent results. However, the accuracy of 
the FAIR model is inevitably impaired by its tailored algorithms, and this inaccuracy becomes 
more obvious in certain cases, such as in long-tailed distribution scenarios. This is because the 
FAIR model uses triangular distributions to approximate input distributions and relies on 
cached data and interpolation for calculation. As we illustrated in subsection 6.2, when LEF 
has the long-tail feature or LEF and LM follow other distributions, the FAIR accuracy 
decreases. In comparison, FAIR-BN can provide stable and accurate results in general and in 
these specific cases. The calculation of FAIR-MC is intuitive and straightforward. To 
implement calculations through the FAIR model, which are listed in Table 1, FAIR-MC 
generates random samples following determined input distributions and operates these samples 
following the corresponding function to simulate the output variable. Since no other 
approximation techniques are applied, we assume a large number of samples generated by 
FAIR-MC can reflect the distribution of the output variable. Illustrated by the experimental 
results, FAIR-MC and FAIR-BN outperform the FAIR model in accuracy. 
 
The three methods have identical efficiency in calculating LEF and its sub-factors. The FAIR 
model calculation is more efficient when performing risk aggregation compared with the other 
algorithms. This efficiency is achieved by the pre-processing of cached data which is calculated 
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from 27 × 12 × 1000000  samples that are generated by simulation [15]. In comparison, 
FAIR-BN and FAIR-MC can still have comparable efficiency compared with the FAIR model 
in conducting the 𝑅𝐴1 process but require more calculation time in conducting the 𝑅𝐴2 process 
because each calculation is done anew for each case rather than reused from a cache. With 
more computational source available (i.e. Using GPU Clusters) and optimize the code 
efficiency, the gap of computational cost in the 𝑅𝐴2 process will further decrease.  
 
The FAIR model and the proposed FAIR-BN do address “small data”. The input of the FAIR 
model can be based on historical data, expertise or both of them, which makes “small data” 
acceptable. For example, in the FAIR model, the input of Primary Loss Event Frequency (PLEF) 
is a triangular distribution, whose parameters (lower bound, upper bound, and most likely value) 
can be assigned by historical data or by an expert’s knowledge. Large data is not a necessary 
condition here: if a loss event happens five times a year, parameters of the triangular 
distribution can still be determined based on this frequency and adjusted by an expert. The 
FAIR-BN can similarly specify inputs using small data. Moreover, in the FAIR-BN, there is 
more flexibility, since there is no limitation on the input distributions.   
 
In practice, risk factors (i.e. LEF and LM) can have diverse features, but the algorithms of 
FAIR are based on the precondition that input variables follow triangular distributions. 
Otherwise, cached data and the application of the BMD function (see Appendix B) become 
invalid. In contrast, the FAIR-BN and FAIR-MC employ more flexible algorithms which do 
not have limitations of input. Calculations for both FAIR and FAIR-MC are based on sampling, 
which provides no modularized modelling mechanism; hence neither FAIR nor FAIR-MC are 
easily extendable with other mature CRA models for risk assessment and decision making. In 
comparison, FAIR-BN can easily incorporate other dedicated CRA models, which is 
significant in practice. We have illustrated the expandability of FAIR-BN by extending it using 
a process-oriented model and a defend-attack game model in Section 7.  
The three methods all have their pros and cons. When preliminary and high-level risk 
assessment is required, where efficiency is prioritized over the accuracy, the FAIR model 
would be the preferable choice. FAIR-MC is more suitable in cases where greater accuracy is 
required, but no further modular extension of the model is needed. FAIR-BN would be the best 
choice if risk managers or researchers require higher result accuracy, modular expandability of 
the model for more detailed analysis, and integrated decision supporting. 
9. Conclusion 
The FAIR model provides both a methodology and a tool for cybersecurity risk analysis and 
calculation. It is an ideal choice for conducting risk assessment where the focus is on 
calculating expected economic loss arising from cybersecurity risk. However, FAIR makes 
inflexible assumptions that limit both its accuracy for a range of real-world scenarios and the 
possibility of integrating it into other mature CRA models. We have revealed the structure 
underlying FAIR and tested it against algorithmic alternatives in the form of (a) an MC version 
of FAIR (FAIR-MC) and (b) a BN version (FAIR-BN). Experimental results show that, when 
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we adopt the FAIR model’s underlying assumptions and input distribution requirements, both 
FAIR and FAIR-BN produce favourable results when compared with FAIR-MC. However, the 
FAIR model provides less accurate results in a number of scenarios, primarily where we have 
a long-tailed distribution. Hence, the approximation approach embedded within FAIR 
improves efficiency but at a cost in accuracy. In comparison, FAIR-BN provides more stable 
performance in result accuracy across a wider set of scenarios involving widely varied 
distributions, but at a cost in efficiency. 
As well as carrying out an empirical evaluation of FAIR we have also analysed the rigidity of 
FAIR and shown how it can be extended, using FAIR-BN as the foundation, to cope with more 
diverse distributions and statistical functions, but also, more importantly, to accommodate 
causal reasoning for modelling richer defend-attack contexts. We have illustrated this by 
constructing the Extended FAIR-BNs (EFBNs) incorporating a process-oriented model and a 
defend-attack game model. EFBN can model relevant knowledge about the causal processes 
that give risk to cyber events and the likely economic consequences of such events and do so 
in a way that is consistent and compatible with the FAIR model. Based on these results, our 
future research will focus on promoting advanced EFBN, from both process-oriented and 
game-theoretic perspectives, and exploring constructing EFBN from data. 
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Appendix A: The Bounded Metalog Distribution 
A Bounded Metalog Distribution (BMD) is a quantile function of a random variable 𝑀. A 
BMD can be specified by distinct quantile points on the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) 
of 𝑀, and then is used to simulate samples of  𝑀 stochastically in the FAIR model, by inputting 
randomly generated probabilities (from 0 to 1) into its expression. Constructing the BMD of 
the total loss variable is the core of how risk aggregation is effectively conducted in the FAIR 
model. Since BMD is derived from its general version, Metalog Distribution (MD) [24], which 
does not have lower or upper bound, we start from the MD to explain the BMD. 
Given 𝑛 distinct quantile points on the CDF of a random variable, the corresponding n-term 
MD can be uniquely specified. The formal definition is described as below. 
Definition 1 [24]: The Metalog distribution of a random variable M with 𝑛 terms is shown by 
formula (A.1): 
  𝑀𝑛(𝑦; 𝒙, 𝒚) =  (A.1) 
𝑎1 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
1 − 𝑦
) for 𝑛 = 2  
𝑎1 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
1 − 𝑦
) + 𝑎3(𝑦 − 0.5)𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
1 − 𝑦
) for 𝑛 = 3  
𝑎1 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
1 − 𝑦
) + 𝑎3(𝑦 − 0.5)𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
1 − 𝑦
) + 𝑎4(𝑦 − 0.5) for 𝑛 = 4  
𝑀𝑛−1 + 𝑎𝑛(𝑦 − 0.5)
𝑛−1
2  for odd 𝑛 ≥ 5  
𝑀𝑛−1 + 𝑎𝑛(𝑦 − 0.5)
𝑛
2
−1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦
1 − 𝑦
) for even 𝑛 ≥ 6  
Where 𝑦 is a cumulative probability with 0 < y < 1. Column vectors 𝐱 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚) and 𝐲 =
(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑚) are of length 𝑚(≥ 𝑛). Each pair of (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) represents a point on the CDF of the 
random variable 𝑀, with 0 < 𝑦𝑖 < 1, and at least 𝑛 of 𝑦𝑖  are distinct. The column vector of 
scaling constants 𝐚 =  (𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛)is given by formula (A.2) 
𝐚 = [𝐘𝑛
𝑇𝐘𝑛]
−1𝐘𝑛
𝑇𝐱  (A.2) 
where 𝐘𝑛
𝑇 is the transpose of 𝐘𝑛, whilst the 𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix 𝐘𝑛 is shown by (A.3): 
 𝐘𝑛 =   (A.3) 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1
1 − 𝑦1
)
⋮
1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑚
1 − 𝑦𝑚
)
]
 
 
 
 
 for 𝑛 = 2  
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[
 
 
 
 1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1
1 − 𝑦1
) (𝑦1 − 0.5)𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1
1 − 𝑦1
)
⋮
1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑚
1 − 𝑦𝑚
) (𝑦𝑚 − 0.5)𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑚
1 − 𝑦𝑚
)
]
 
 
 
 
 for 𝑛 = 3 
 
[
 
 
 
 1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1
1 − 𝑦1
) (𝑦1 − 0.5)𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1
1 − 𝑦1
) (𝑦1 − 0.5)
⋮
1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑚
1 − 𝑦𝑚
) (𝑦𝑚 − 0.5)𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑚
1 − 𝑦𝑚
) (𝑦𝑚 − 0.5)]
 
 
 
 
 for 𝑛 = 4 
 
[ 𝐘𝑛−1|
(𝑦1 − 0.5)
𝑛−1
2
⋮
(𝑦𝑚 − 0.5)
𝑛−1
2
] for odd 𝑛 ≥ 5 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 𝐘𝑛−1|
(𝑦1 − 0.5)
𝑛
2
−1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1
1 − 𝑦1
)
⋮
(𝑦𝑚 − 0.5)
𝑛
2
−1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑚
1 − 𝑦𝑚
)
]
 
 
 
 
 for even 6n   
 
The proof that the quantile function of a random variable 𝑀 can be parameterized by points on 
the CDF of 𝑀 is provided in [24].  
The Bounded Metalog Distribution is defined based on Metalog Distribution as below: 
Definition 2 [24]: Bounded Metalog Distribution (BMD) 
A BMD is a modified Melalog distribution which has known lower and upper bounds, 𝑏𝑙 and 
𝑏𝑢 respectively, with 𝑏𝑙 < 𝑏𝑢. It is also called the logit Metalog distribution. The BMD is the 
transformation of a Metalog distribution, in which 𝑧 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥−𝑏𝑙
𝑏𝑢−𝑥
) is Metalog-distributed.  
Setting 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥−𝑏𝑙
𝑏𝑢−𝑥
) equal to (A.1) and solving for 𝑥, the BMD function with 𝑛 terms can be 
obtained from (A.4): 
𝑀𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑦; 𝒙, 𝒚, 𝑏𝑙, 𝑏𝑢) =
{
 
 
𝑏𝑙 + 𝑏𝑢𝑒
𝑀𝑛(𝑦)
1 + 𝑒𝑀𝑛(𝑦)
0 < y < 1
𝑏𝑙                              y =0
𝑏𝑢                             y =1
  (A.4) 
In the FAIR model, the quantile function of the total loss variable is represented by the BMD, 
which is constructed using cached quantile values. Then by randomly generating a 
probability, y, and substituting it in formula (A.4), a sample of the total loss can be simulated. 
This is the basic idea of how BMD is implemented to efficiently simulate losses. We explain 
it formally and technically in Appendix B. 
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Appendix B: Application of BMD in Risk Aggregation 
In the FAIR model, Primary Losses (PL) and Secondary Losses (SL) are simulated using the 
same risk aggregation method. Here we use PL as the example to explain how risk aggregation 
is implemented in the FAIR model. Firstly, a large amount of PL samples, 𝐿𝑃, are simulated 
associating with predetermined Frequencies (F), 𝑓𝑗 ,  and different shape modes of Loss 
Magnitudes (LM), ?̂?𝑘, using an MC method in advance.  Here 𝑓𝑗 ∈ 𝐹 , with 𝑗 from 0 to 27, 
and 𝐹 is a set of a few predetermined frequencies covering 0 to 1001 (The FAIR model assumes 
that when the frequency is larger than 1001, distributions of 𝐿𝑃  would converge to normal 
distributions. Therefore, 𝐿𝑃  can be represented by normal distributions directly rather than 
using risk aggregation to generate its samples). Moreover, the FAIR model introduces a 
concept, shape mode, classifying all the triangular distributions into 12 shape modes. The shape 
mode, ?̂?𝑘, represents the ratio 𝑟 =
𝑀𝑚𝑙−𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑛
, and is classified into a set of predetermined 
ratios, S = {0, 0.1, 0.2, ⋯, 0.9, 1, 1.01}. These  𝐿𝑃 samples are firstly taken to average over the 
corresponding 𝑓𝑖 , and then used to generate Cumulative Density Functions (CDF) of average 
samples,   ?̅?𝑃 , corresponding to each pair of  (𝑓𝑗 , ?̂?𝑘) . The quantile value vector, 𝐯 =
(𝑣1, … , 𝑣9), associated with nine predetermined quantile probabilities, 𝐲 =
(0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.99, 0.999), on each CDF can then be calculated and are 
cached as a vector. By doing so, a 27 *12 sized data matrix is produced. Each element of this 
matrix is a vector, 𝒗, corresponding to a pair of (𝑓𝑗 , ?̂?𝑘). This data matrix is prepared and 
provided by the FAIR model [15]. 
Based on the cached data, the FAIR model approximates the quantile value vector, 𝒗, for the 
actual frequency sample  𝑓𝑖  and a LM distribution of ratio,  𝑟, by applying interpolation on 
cached vectors, of which the corresponding  𝑓𝑗  and ?̂?𝑘are close to 𝑓𝑖  and 𝑟. We extract the 
interpolation formula from the FAIR model and show it by formula (B.1): 
𝒗 = (𝐼𝑛 (
𝒗𝟏
𝟏 − 𝒗𝟏
) × 𝑎 + 𝐼𝑛 (
𝒗2
1 − 𝒗2
) × (1 − 𝑎)) × 𝑏 + (𝐼𝑛 (
𝒗3
1 − 𝒗3
) × 𝑎 + 𝐼𝑛 (
𝒗3
1 − 𝒗3
) × (1 − 𝑎))
× (1 − 𝑏) 
where 𝑎 =
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥− 𝑓𝑖
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛
 and 𝑏 =
𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑟
𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛
. 
 
    
(B.1) 
In formula (B.1), 𝒗 is the quantile value vector which stores approximated quantile values 
corresponding to  𝑓𝑖  and  𝑟 , while 𝒗1 , 𝒗2  and 𝒗3 are corresponding to  (𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛,  𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛),  
( 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,  𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛) and (𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑟max )  respectively. The frequency, 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 , is the frequency in the 
predetermined frequency set,  𝐹 , which is close to and larger than  𝑓𝑖 , while  𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the 
frequency in 𝐹 , which is close to and smaller than  𝑓𝑖 . The ratio  𝑟, which calculated 
by 
𝑀𝑚𝑙−𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑛
, represents the actual shape mode of a triangular distribution;  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the shape 
ratio in 𝑆, which is close to and larger than 𝑟, while  𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the shape ratio in 𝑆, which is close 
to and smaller than 𝑟.  
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Therefore, for each pair of (𝑓𝑖, 𝑟), the quantile value vector of the corresponding ?̅?𝑃  can be 
approximated using cached data  (𝒗1 , 𝒗2  and 𝒗3) following formula (B.1). The 
approximated  𝒗 is then used to specify the Metalog distribution [24] of  ?̅?𝑃 . The Metalog 
distribution is a kind of logistic quantile distribution that can be determined by quantile values. 
For example, 𝒗, which contains nine quantile values, can be used to specify a 9-term Metalog 
distribution of ?̅?𝑃 . We denote this distribution as 𝑀9(𝑦). Assigning a uniformly generated 
probability to 𝑦, a logistic sample of ?̅?𝑃 can be calculated by 𝑀9(𝑦). Since 𝑀9(𝑦) represents 
the logistic sample of ?̅?𝑃 related to (𝑓𝑖, 𝑟), the sample of  𝐿𝑃,  𝐿𝑃(𝑖), can be generated by taking 
exponent and changing scale of  𝑀9(𝑦)  following formula (B.2), which is referred to as 
Bounded Metalog Distribution (BMD) in [24]. We have described details of Metalog 
distribution and BMD in Appendix A.   
 𝐿𝑃(𝑖) =  𝑓𝑖 ×(𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑛 +𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑀9(𝑦)
1 + 𝑒𝑀9(𝑦)
)  (B.2) 
In conclusion, the core mechanism of conducting risk aggregation in the FAIR model is to 
construct BMDs of the given ( 𝐹𝑃, 𝐿𝑀𝑃). More precisely, for each sample of 𝐹𝑃, 𝑓𝑖, a BMD is 
specified using cached data and is then used to generate a sample of primary loss, 𝐿𝑃(𝑖), by 
substituting 𝑦  using a uniformly generated probability in formula (B.2). By this way, the 
sample vector of 𝐿𝑃 is generated. By now, we have explained how risk aggregation, 𝑅𝐴, is 
implemented to simulate primary losses in the FAIR model. We denote this simulation by 𝐿𝑃 =
𝑅𝐴(𝐹𝑃,  𝐿𝑀𝑃). In addition, the FAIR model does not distinguish risk aggregation of simulating 
primary losses and secondary losses. In other words, secondary losses are simulated following 
the same way which can be represented by  𝐿𝑆 = 𝑅𝐴(𝐹𝑆,  𝐿𝑀𝑆), where 𝐹𝑆 and 𝐿𝑀𝑆 represent 
frequencies and loss magnitudes of secondary losses respectively. Furthermore, the Total 
Loss, 𝐿𝑇, is simulated by  𝐿𝑇 = 𝐿𝑃 + 𝐿𝑆. 
  
 
31 
 
Appendix C: Factorization of the BN for 𝑅𝐴2 process 
We demonstrate the adjusted Compound Density Factorization (CDF) method in Figure 16. 
Since each total loss variable  𝑇𝑛,𝑚 is mutually exclusive, i.e. for a given value of N, the sum 
of probabilities related to each possible scenario is equal to one, we factorize the BN (e) by 
introducing extra two kinds of variables. Boolean variables, 𝑊𝑛,𝑚 (with only two states True 
and False) are used to assign weightings proportional to  𝑃𝑛,𝑚 , to each pair of nodes, i.e. 
{𝑇0,0, 𝑇1,0}, {𝐹1,0, 𝑇1,1}, …, {𝐹𝑁,𝑁−1, 𝑇𝑁,𝑁}. Factor variables, 𝐹𝑛,𝑚, are created to calculate the 
weighted aggregation for each step. 
 
Figure 16 Factorization of the BN in the 𝑅𝐴2 process 
The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for 𝑊𝑛,𝑚 is defined by formula (C.1): 
                                     
𝑃(𝑊𝑛,𝑚−1 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) =
 𝑃0,0 +  𝑃1,0+,…+  𝑃𝑛,𝑚−1
 𝑃0,0 +  𝑃1,0+,…+  𝑃𝑛,𝑚
  (C.1) 
The conditionally deterministic expression for variable 𝐹𝑛,𝑚 , which is called a partitioned 
node in the BN parlance, is defined by formula (C.2): 
                                     
 𝐹𝑛,𝑚 = {
 𝐹𝑛,𝑚−1 if  𝑊𝑛,𝑚 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒
 𝑇𝑛,𝑚 if  𝑊𝑛,𝑚 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
 
 (C.2) 
Since 𝑇0,0 and 𝑇1,0 are mutually exclusive, the marginal distribution for variable 𝐹1,0 is 
represented by formula (C.3): 
                                 𝐹1,0 = 𝑃(𝑊1,0 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) 𝑇0,0 + 𝑃(𝑊1,0 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) 𝑇1,0  (C.3) 
Similarly, the marginal for variable 𝐹𝑛,𝑚 is represented by formula (C.4): 
                               𝐹𝑛,𝑚 = 𝑃(𝑊𝑛,𝑚 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) 𝐹𝑛,𝑚−1 + 𝑃(𝑊𝑛,𝑚 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) 𝑇𝑛,𝑚   (C.4) 
After factorizing the density aggregation process, we can calculate the marginal distribution 
of 𝐹𝑛,𝑚 more efficiently following formula (C.4), which yields the risk aggregation result given 
primary and secondary loss frequencies and their loss magnitudes. We have implemented this 
method using AgenaRisk packages.   
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Appendix D: Experimental Results for Subsidiary Risk Factors 
Table 8  Comparison results of 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹 = 𝐹𝑇𝐸 ×  𝑃𝑉 
with 𝑃𝑉 following 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.2,𝑚𝑙 = 0.3,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.7) (the calculation is similar with 𝐹𝑇𝐸 = 𝐹𝐶  ×  𝑃𝐴). 
 
Table 9 Comparison results of 𝐹𝑃 = Poisson (𝜆 = 𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐹) 
 
 
Table 10 Comparison results of 𝐹𝑆 = 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝑛 = 𝐹𝑃, 𝑃 = 𝑃𝑆𝐿) 
with 𝑃𝑆𝐿 following 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.2,𝑚𝑙 = 0.3,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.7). 
 
Table 11 Results of 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃(𝑃𝑇𝐶 > 𝑃𝑅𝑆) 
With 𝑃𝑅𝑆 simulated by 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 0.2,𝑀𝑑 = 0.3,𝑀𝑎𝑥 = 0.7). 
 
  
min mid max FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Include 0 0 200 500 92.5 93.8 93.3 2329.5 2519.6 2442.9 226.1 241.8 236.3 0.0348 0.0057
2 Long tail 100 200 1000 171.7 173.0 173.2 8570.6 9095.6 9096.7 440.3 456.4 462.0 0.0272 0.0063
3 Left skew 20 80 200 39.7 40.0 40.0 338.2 364.0 356.6 91.7 96.6 95.6 0.0217 0.0058
4 Right skew 20 160 200 50.5 50.7 50.7 431.3 448.3 443.2 102.7 105.4 105.8 0.0453 0.0090
5 0 and long tail 0 200 1000 158.1 159.9 159.9 9287.4 9753.9 9866.9 433.1 458.2 458.4 0.0260 0.0077
Average: 0.0310 0.0069
Test Description 
MeanFTE J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
Variance 99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
min mid max FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Include 0 0 200 500 237.7 232.6 233.3 10219.0 10780.0 10788.0 466.0 464.6 468.0 0.0106 0.0024
2 Long tail 100 200 1000 441.1 434.5 433.2 39325.0 41563.0 41027.0 921.0 464.6 920.0 0.0162 0.0027
3 Left skew 20 80 200 101.2 99.8 100.0 1437.6 1487.6 1501.9 191.5 464.6 192.0 0.0163 0.0067
4 Right skew 20 160 200 128.5 126.5 126.6 1520.3 1624.4 1616.4 197.5 202.4 202.0 0.0272 0.0130
5 0 and long tail 0 200 1000 408.6 400.3 400.0 44983.0 47421.0 47035.0 916.0 908.5 915.0 0.0148 0.0046
Average: 0.0170 0.0059
Test Description 
MPLEF Mean Variance 99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
min mid max FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Include 0 0 200 500 95.3 93.6 93.4 2401.3 2562.1 2543.0 231.5 238.2 240.0 0.0127 0.0041
2 Long tail 100 200 1000 176.7 173.6 173.4 8796.3 9451.9 9330.9 452.0 469.1 466.0 0.0231 0.0029
3 Left skew 20 80 200 40.6 40.2 40.0 381.9 405.3 397.5 97.5 99.5 99.0 0.0127 0.0058
4 Right skew 20 160 200 51.7 50.7 50.7 479.3 497.2 493.7 109.0 108.4 110.0 0.0355 0.0066
5 0 and long tail 0 200 1000 163.6 160.5 159.9 9445.9 10249.0 10017.0 447.0 463.4 461.0 0.0223 0.0069
Average: 0.0213 0.0053
99th J(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
J(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
VarianceMeanMPLEF
Test Description 
min mid max FAIR FAIR-BN FAIR-MC
1 Include 0 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.17 0.14 0.14
2 Long tail 0.10 0.20 1.00 0.51 0.52 0.52
3 left skew 0.20 0.40 0.80 0.62 0.65 0.65
4 right skew 0.20 0.60 0.80 0.75 0.78 0.79
5 0 and long tail 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.46 0.47 0.46
Test description 
PVPTC
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Appendix E: Experimental Results with Euclidean Distance 
Measurement 
Table 12 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with inputs following triangular distributions-the Euclidean distance measurement  
 
Table 13 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑇 distributions 
-the Euclidean distance measurement  
 
Table 14 Results comparison of 𝐿𝑃 distributions 
with 𝐹𝑃 following long-tail distributions-the Euclidean distance measurement  
 
  
min mid max
1 0 20 90 0.0232 0.0202
2 0 230 300 0.0387 0.0224
3 20 80 180 0.0306 0.0213
4 60 250 400 0.0339 0.0355
5 20 250 630 0.0241 0.0211
6 15 30 250 0.0216 0.0203
7 15 30 540 0.0263 0.0218
Average: 0.0283 0.0232
Test 
Eu(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
MPLEF Eu(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
min mid max
1 0 200 500 0.0361 0.0128
2 50 200 1000 0.0448 0.0160
3 20 80 200 0.0331 0.0304
4 20 160 200 0.0415 0.0149
5 0 200 1000 0.0337 0.0151
Average: 0.0378 0.0178
Test
Eu(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
Eu(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
MPLEF
PLEF PLM
1 Weibul l LogNormal 0.1822 0.0166
2 Log Normal LogNormal 0.2745 0.0147
3 Gamma LogNormal 0.1799 0.0177
Average: 0.2122 0.0163
Eu(FAIR,
FAIR-MC)
Eu(FAIR-BN,
FAIR-MC)
Input Distributions
Test 
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